



## **Wyoming Market Percentage**






#### WYOMING MEDICAL CENTER - PAYER MIX



Source: Medicare Cost Report Analysis




#### CHEYENNE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER - PAYER MIX



Source: Medicare Cost Report Analysis



## The Problem: Employer premiums have risen, and so have employee contributions.



<sup>\*</sup>Estimate is statistically different from estimates for the previous year shown (p<.05).


SOURCE: KFF Employer Health Benefits Survey, 2018; Kaiser/HRET Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits. 1999-2017



## Inpatient Use Continued to Decline but Prices Rose Substantially Use trending back to baseline.




## Outpatient Prices Drove Spending Growth Use trending back to baseline.






**Health Care Cost Institute. (2018).** 2016 Health Care Cost and Utilization Report. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.healthcostinstitute.org/report/2016-health-care-cost-utilization-report/">http://www.healthcostinstitute.org/report/2016-health-care-cost-utilization-report/</a>. Prices are from Appendix Table A3,, utilization and intensity is estimated by dividing spending (from Appendix Table A1) by prices.

### Inpatient Days/1,000 member months






### Outpatient Visits/1,000 member months







#### Overall PMPM Costs – WY v. MT



## PMPM Costs by Service Type






Source: Wyoming MPCD as of 9/17/2019


Provider Type	Wyoming PMPM		Montana PMPM			Wyoming Provider PMPM as a % of Total PMPM	(	Difference Wyoming vs. Montana)	Wyoming % of Montana
All Others	\$	64.08	\$	62.13		11.44%	\$	1.95	3.14%
Behavioral Health	\$	13.28	\$	13.45		2.37%	\$	(0.17)	-1.26%
Emergency	\$	38.13	\$	42.48		6.81%	\$	(4.35)	-10.24%
Hospital Inpatient	\$	93.25	\$	62.01		16.64%	\$	31.24	50.38%
Hospital Outpatient	\$	93.17	\$	77.98		16.63%	\$	15.19	19.48%
Other Outpatient	\$	34.05	\$	22.93		6.08%	\$	11.12	48.50%
Pharmacy	\$	72.08	\$	79.28		12.87%	\$	(7.20)	-9.08%
Primary Care	\$	58.69	\$	18.24		10.48%	\$	40.45	221.77%
Specalist	\$	51.86	\$	27.46		9.26%	\$	24.40	88.86%
Surgery	\$	41.66	\$	22.58		7.44%	\$	19.08	84.50%
PMPM Total	\$	560.25	\$	428.54		100.00%	\$	131.71	30.73%
Note: PMPM data in this chart is from year end 2018 - the last full year of data									




## Commercial Relative Price TREND Varies at the State Level: Comparison of 5 States



## Single Health-System: Indiana vs. Michigan TOTAL Relative Inpatient plus Outpatient Prices 2017




#### **KNEE REPLACEMENT**






#### **HEART STRESS TEST WITH ULTRASOUND**




#### **BLOOD DRAW**




### Across 25 States: Average Relative Hospital Prices, 2017

Percent Employer Health Plans Pay Hospitals Relative to What Medicare Would Pay




## Wyoming: TOTAL Hospital Commercial Paid

Relative to Medicare, 2017 - (inpatient plus outpatient)




## Wyoming: INPATIENT Hospital Commercial Paid

Relative to Medicare, 2017




## Wyoming: OUTPATIENT Hospital Commercial Paid

Relative to Medicare, 2017




## Wyoming In and Out - Price and Quality




**Overall Relative Price** 

## Wyoming Inpatient - Price and Quality



**Overall Relative Price** 

## Wyoming Outpatient - Price and Quality



**Overall Relative Price** 

### Why Are So Many Hospitals **Losing Money on Medicare?**

"Strong market power leads hospitals to reap higher revenue from private payers. This in turn leads these hospitals to have weaker cost controls. The weaker cost controls lead to higher costs per unit of service. As a result, hospitals have a narrower margin on their Medicare Business."

> Jeffrey Stensland Principal Policy Analyst - MedPAC

By Jeffrey Stensland, Zachary R. Gaumer, and Mark E. Miller

#### **Private-Payer Profits Can Induce Negative Medicare Margins**

DOI: 10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0599 HEALTH AFFAIRS 29. NO. 5 (2010): 1045-1051 o 2010 Project HOPE-The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

ABSTRACT A common assumption is that hospitals have little control over their costs and must charge high rates to private health insurers when Medicare rates are lower than hospital costs. We present evidence that contradicts that common assumption. Hospitals with strong market power and higher private-payer and other revenues appear to have less pressure to constrain their costs. Thus, these hospitals have higher costs per unit of service, which can lead to losses on Medicare patients. Hospitals under more financial pressure—with less market share and less ability to charge higher private rates-often constrain costs and can generate profits on Medicare patients.

Jeffrey Stensland

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Zachary R. Gaumer is a senior analyst at MedPAC.

Mark E. Miller is the executive director of MedPAC.

ospitals' profit margins on privately insured patients have risen dramatically in recent years, while profit margins on Medicare patients have fallen. Payment and cost data gathered by the American Hospital Association (AHA) reveal that the average payment-to-cost ratio for privately insured patients rose from 116 percent of costs in 1999 to 132 percent of costs in 2007.14

At the same time, the average payment-to-cost ratio for Medicare patients fell from 107 percent of allowable costs to 94 percent. Medicare profitability fell because costs rose faster than the 3 percent annual increase in Medicare payment rates that occurred from 1999 to 2007. This paper explores the reasons why private-payer profit margins are inversely related to Medicare profit

In this paper we argue that high profits that hospitals earn on payments from private payers are a key reason that Medicare margins have declined. First, using a national data set of all of the hospitals participating in the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS), we show that hospitals with high profits from non-Medicare sources have had higher costs per unit of service than hospitals with limited resources. These focused on differences in resources among hos-

higher costs result in lower Medicare margins because costs do not affect Medicare revenues, which for hospitals are largely based on predetermined payment rates. The apparent chain of causation is as follows. Strong market power leads hospitals to reap higher revenues from private payers. This in turn leads these hospitals to have weaker cost controls. The weaker cost controls lead to higher costs per unit of service. As a result, hospitals have a narrower margin on their Medicare business.


To corroborate our empirical findings, we conducted data analyses of hospitals in two cities. Newspapers in these cities have identified certain ho spitals as having strong market positions that allow them to generate substantial revenues from private payers.5,6

One of these markets is in Massachusetts, where the attorney general has recently shown that prices paid by a single insurer to the highestpaid hospitals are roughly double the rates paid to the lowest-paid hospitals.7 The attorney general's preliminary report finds that these price differentials are associated with market power rather than purely with the complexity of patients' health care needs.


The newspaper accounts of the two markets

## Medicare Cost Report


Wyoming Compared to All Other States





























So, what do we know from Medicare Cost Reports?

Wyoming hospital revenues are high.

Wyoming hospital capital and medical services costs are high.

High revenues and high costs mean Wyoming hospital margins are low (even negative).

So, what are the expenses driving hospital costs?


# Low volumes spread over high fixed costs?

Labor costs?

Capital expenditures?



#### **HOSPITAL BEDS PER 1,000 POPULATION**











#### Largest Occupations in General Medical and Surgical Hospitals, May 2018




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics






#### Annual mean wage of nursing assistants, by state, May 2018 Annual mean wage \$22,750 - \$26,410 \$29,110 - \$31,450 \$26,800 - \$28,810 \$32,130 - \$39,830 WA ME MT ND OR MN ID WI NY SD WY MI IΑ PA NE NV ОН DE. IN UT IL MD CA CO ЭC KS МО KY NC TN ОΚ ΑZ NM AR SC GΑ AL MS ΤX LA ΑK FL PR /






### Annual mean wage of radiologic technologists, by state, May 2018











#### Annual mean wage of physicians and surgeons, all other, by state, May 2018 Annual mean wage \$185,210 - \$208,820 \$229,100 - \$275,840 **\$94,060 - \$183,920 \$209,580 - \$229,090** WA ME MT ND OR MN ID WI NY SD MA 🤝 WY MI IΑ PA NE NV ОН DE. IN UT IL ΜD CA CO ЭC VA KS МО KY NC TN οк ΑZ NM AR SC GΑ ΑL MS TX LA ΑK FL PR 3 Blank areas indicate data not available.











So how are you feeling right now?






## The goal is VALUE

- We need to have conversations about what services we can afford to have outside our front door.
  - 75 years of the delivery system telling us what they will deliver and at what price has gotten us where we are.

## We have to take Ownership



# Takeaway #1: Price transparency is the new normal...Hospital Shopping *Should be* a Team Sport





# Takeaway #2: Markets Need Information, Buyers Need Options

- "Chaos behind a veil of secrecy" (Uwe Reinhardt)
- "Where there's mystery there's margin"

- We need transparency in both cost and quality
- We need solutions that will create competition based on best quality at best cost



# Takeaway #3: Commercial Payment Models Can Be Transparent and Straight Forward



### How does Medicare pay? -relatively straightforward

base payment \* facility-specific adjustments \* casemix + outliers + bonuses: one number comparison of hospital prices!



### Private Sector moving to Benchmarked Bundles

One fixed price for all services associated with an episode of care.



### **Advantages**

Simplifies shopping

Incentives care coordination and avoidance of unnecessary services

Stabilizes price trend

Stabilizes employer budgets



# Takeaway #4: There are Numerous Strategies Available to Drive Value



#### **Benefit Design Levers**

Referenced Based Bundles

Multiples of Medicare

Narrow/Tiered Networks

Centers of Excellence

Direct employer to hospital contracting



**Policy Levers** 

Prohibit anti-gag clause between carriers and hospitals

Prohibit anti-tiering contract provisions

Prohibit anti-narrow networks


Limit/cap on out-of-network charges





## Reference Based Bundled Payments


or

Reference Based Episodes of Care
















### Together we can get there.

